Drawing on digitaltrace data, publicly accessible government documents, and journalistic reports, this research integrates Beck's risk society theory with digital media theories to examine the mediated process of risk definition and assessment of PM2.5 (particulate matters with a diameter less than 2.5 micrometers) in a networked public sphere. Network and content analysis of a PM2.5 Twitter network shows that political and professional elite remained the most powerful producers of risk definition. Established media played a key role, yet faced challenges from a variety of actors who disseminated and filtered information. Laypersons, while peripheral, actively interacted with elite and established media. The blurring geographic boundary in the PM2.5 Twitter network revealed an emerging transnational public sphere, which, however, was segregated by language. This research advances a layered understanding of the contingent, paradoxical media impact for social changes in a risk society.
As importantly, developed in the age of mass media, the risk society theory needs an update as social media increasingly facilitate the circulation of symbols and images of contention in the public sphere.
In what follows, we first introduce the background of the PM2.5 as an indicator of air pollution and a dispute on collecting, interpreting, and disseminating PM2.5 data between the US and the Chinese governments as well as why Twitter provided a strategic research site. Second, in the literature review, we argue that the networked public sphere theory can help to advance the risk society theory by directing attention to its networked and mediated nature. Our research integrates the risk society theory with theories of networked public sphere to examine the mediated production and distribution of risk definition. Aiming for a systemic analysis of the mediated risk society, we center on (1) identifying roles of institutional and individual actors and their interrelationships and (2) articulating how media shape the production and distribution of risk definition. In the third part, we describe data and analysis strategies and present our results. Using digital trace data, publicly accessible government documents, and journalistic reports, we conduct content and network analysis to examine a Twitter network about PM2.5 (particulate matters with a diameter smaller than 2.5 micrometers in the air) in China, the world largest emitter of carbon dioxide since 2008.
Background: PM2.5 dispute and Twitter
While high levels of PM2.5 had been in the air, the Chinese public had little risk consciousness of PM2.5 before 2008, letting alone its causes and health consequences. 1 In February 2008, the US embassy in Beijing installed an air quality monitor in its compound, to measure the levels of PM2.5. In late August, right after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the embassy began updating hourly PM2.5 readings and the corresponding air quality index (AQI) number via the Twitter account @BeijingAir. The embassy claimed that its PM2.5 program aimed to help mission personnel and the larger American community living or traveling in China to plan their outdoor activities (US State Department, 2012) .
The Chinese state has built a Great Firewall to monitor, filter, and block content, including banning Facebook and Twitter in mainland China since 2009 (Chen, 2014) . The state has developed sophisticated tactics to infiltrate and influence the digital public sphere, including paying digital mercenaries to post pro-government messages or using trolls and bots to influence public discourse. Despite prevalent state intervention and market commercialization, digital technologies have enabled an unprecedented number of Chinese citizens to participate in online activities with varying degrees of contention. Many mainland Chinese get around the Great Firewall to use Twitter through mobile device or virtual private network (VPN) service (Grandoni, 2011) . About 14% of Chinese Internet users aged 16-64 years reported using Twitter, making it one of the top 10 social media platforms in China (Kemp, 2015) . As importantly, citizens in Chinese societies beyond mainland China such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore or members of the global Chinese diaspora have unblocked access to Twitter. Twitter revealed that it was targeting 35 million native Chinese speakers living outside of China when adding a Chinese language interface in 2011 (Kan, 2011) . Furthermore, given China's growing sociopolitical significance, news and issues in China have received greater attention from individuals and organizations who are not necessarily Chinese or located in any of the Chinese societies (Reese, 2015) .
Before and after Twitter was blocked in China in 2009, Chinese Twitter users disseminated the tweets posted by @BeijingAir to the Chinese Internet sphere. The US embassy's independent monitoring of PM2.5 made obvious the Chinese government's systematic non-or under-reporting of air population. The AQI, based on the levels of PM2.5 concentration, has been adopted internationally, including the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to indicate the health consequences of the levels of air pollution. Yet, before 2012, the Chinese government used its own Air Pollution Index (API), which did not include PM2.5 measure at all. Even after 2012 when China included PM2.5 in its API, its interpretation for health consequences only met the minimum set by the World Health Organization (WHO), much less stringent than AQI. As a result, it was not uncommon when the Chinese API indicated the air quality was good, the AQI used by the US embassy declared the air quality was hazardous. The gaps between the two readings caught public attention and ignited online debates on air quality, its measurement, interpretation, and government transparency.
Behind the scene, China's Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested and criticized the US embassy a few times, claiming that the embassy's PM2.5 program was 'not fair', 'confusing', and 'insulting'. The embassy, however, did not budge. Eventually, a dispute on PM2.5 measurement and assessment broke out between the Chinese and the US governments. On 5 June 2012, a MEP vice minister demanded at a press briefing that 'certain embassies should stop posting air quality data about China online' as it was 'against the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and environmental regulations in China' (People's Daily, 2012) . The next day, the US Department of State rejected the accusation and insisted that the embassy would continue the program (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2012). Internally, US diplomats celebrated the embassy's PM2.5 program as 'a very constructive and positive initiative' (US State Department, 2012), which offered a reality check on air population in China.
The dispute between the two governments as well as the potential but not yet specified health risk attracted Chinese and international media attention and fueled online discussion in and beyond the Chinese Internet sphere. Soon after the dispute, the Chinese government decided to measure and report PM2.5 nationwide in 2013. When Gary Locke, the then US ambassador to China, stepped down in 2014, media in-and outside credited the embassy's PM2.5 program as his major achievement. The PM2.5 dispute between the two governments has led to a range of environmental activism and policy changes in China.
Literature review and research questions
Risk is 'manufactured uncertainties … created by society itself, immanent to society and thus externalizable, collectively imposed and thus individually unavoidable' (Beck & Urry, 2014, p. 82) . According to Beck (1992 Beck ( , 2009 , states, corporations, political and professional elites, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have core position in the risk society as their access to scientific and legal expertise allows them greater capacity to define risks. Beck (1992 Beck ( , 2009 ) also rendered mass media an important role in disseminating elites' definition of risk to laypersons. Mass media serve as citizens' risk receptor and interpreter, translating abstract expert knowledge into symbols and images that help the public to relate with and make sense of. This is especially important to global risk consciousness, which would not exist 'without techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media' (Beck & Urry, 2014, p. 180) . Media representation of local destruction is critical to the formation of global cooperation:
The sensational stories are presented that jolt us out of our apathy and present new standpoints and perspective, the result is an invitation to cross-border commitment, and that institutionalized claims to objectivity and truth are undermined. (Beck, 2009, p. 190) Furthermore, mass media serve more than as a vehicle that channels expert knowledge to the public or as a megaphone that gives the repressed or marginalized a voice. Given the socially constructed nature of risk, mass media are the site where actors contest about risk definition and assessment (Beck, 2002; Fitzgerald & Rubin, 2010 ). Yet, as we discuss in detail below, Beck's risk society theory pays limited attention to the networked and mediated nature of the risk society.
Networked risk society
First, the risk society theory does not specify the roles of different institutional and individual actors and their interrelationships, especially the relations between states, corporations, experts, and laypeople who often have multiple, intersecting, and shifting positions, affiliations, and commitments. For example, the state can be an initiator, suppressor, and sometimes ally of risk definition and assessment. Beck (1997) primarily focused on the interaction between experts and laypeople, arguing that the experts defined, measured, and evaluated risk and laypeople were passive recipients of the risk definition. The invisible nature of risk leaves room for socially constructed risk definition, especially when experts' wrong risk assessment leads to a distrust of scientific rationality. In a later work, Beck saw laypeople as 'alienated from expert systems ' (2009, p. 54 ). Yet, overall, the risk society theory is not clear on whether and in what ways laypeople could participate in risk definition (Cottle, 1998) .
Mediated risk society
Second, the risk society theory falls short in illustrating the extent to which media shape the production and distribution of risk definition. Media logics demand specific format and content of communication as well as narrative strategies. Actors who are able to skillfully and purposefully adjust to media logics are rewarded by greater media exposure and symbolic legitimacy in their effort of raising awareness or resources (Gamson & Meyer, 1996) . Beck (2009) mentioned that media could exaggerate risk in their effort of getting audience attention or be manipulated by public relations and 'argumentation craftsmen' (Cottle, 1998, p. 9) . However, media are far from passive or powerless in their relationship with governments, corporations, or other actors (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith, 1996) . Media organizations and professionals are active players in the risk society, with their own logics and ethics (Hjarvard, 2008) . Media can serve as gatekeeper and agenda setter, supporting, challenging, or criticizing risk definitions advanced by experts, states, or other actors.
Twitter as a networked public sphere
Fundamental to the function of participatory democracy, mass media sustain the public sphere (Habermas, 1962 (Habermas, , 1992 . A networked public sphere refers to the shift of public sphere from analog to digital which allows more and diverse individuals and groups to produce, circulate, and deliberate information and ideas for civic and political action and by so doing disrupt the power of mass media (Benkler, 2006) . The rise of a networked public sphere can also mean the emergence of a transnational public sphere when ideas flow -with greater volume and velocity -between and among local, national, regional, and international media producers, distributors, and audiences (Castells, 1999; Chen & Reese, 2015; Chen & Wellman, 2009 ).
Twitter, as a public communicative space, has technical and communicative affordances that encourage a networked public sphere: the follower-following relations for developing and maintaining a network of friends and followers; the '#' (hashtag) for generating a network of people with shared interests on issues, events, or topics (Ellison & Boyd, 2013) ; the '@' (at) symbol used for tagging another user for direct communication; and the embedded hyperlinks to external media sources for intertextuality and transmediality (Honey & Herring, 2009 ).
Twitter as a social media platform enables a networked public sphere for the interaction between and among different institutional and individual actors in the risk society across geographic and social distances. Twitter has been used by governments, corporations, media, and civil society organizations as they align and compete with one another in the networked public sphere for voice and influence. For example, journalists and media organizations quickly adopted Twitter as information source, outlets of publication and branding, as well as outreach (Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012) . Most trending topics are related to hard news (Lawrence, Molyneux, Coddington, & Holton, 2013) . Twitter has been used by social movement organizations and activists for social and political mobilization (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013) . Twitter also allows non-elites interact with elites. In particular, laypersons may be empowered and their position may shift from members of a passive audience to active users. As importantly, Twitter networks can enable imagined communities as members share similar language, interests, and sense of community (Gruzd, Wellman, & Takhteyev, 2011) .
While some studies show that Twitter can stimulate open, cross-ideological disclosure, political polarization and selective exposure are common on Twitter and other social platforms (Himelboim, Smith, & Shneiderman, 2013) . The influx of more actors such as experts, consultants, and spin doctors into the networked public sphere increases heterogeneity. On the one hand, it can undermine the power of state and mass media. On the other hand, it can make consensus building difficult, especially when polarization has been intendedly used as a strategy to gain attention. A networked public sphere can be 'dissociative' as views are so diverse and segregated that they are posted but not shared, shared but not engaged (Iwabuchi, 2015) . Recent analysis remains inconclusive, demonstrating the presence of both polarized echo chambers and open forum with diverse attitudes in Twitter discussion networks (Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Hugo Lambert, 2015) . Twitter networks can shed light on the production and distribution of risk definition, revealing the networked and mediated nature of the risk society.
If scholars and analysts were overwhelmingly celebratory about the potentials of social media platform for enabling social movements and social changes, the presence of state and corporate interests in such platforms and their power in manipulating such platforms for their own purposes have become increasingly visible. There have been significant participation gaps as a small number of users dominated content contribution, following a power law distribution (Hindman, 2009 ). Yet, the networked public sphere is conducive to both connective and collective action. It allows a diverse array of actors, especially small, alternative, citizen media producers, gain voice in political discourse, especially in the framing process of public issues (Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 2014) . The multiplication of newsmakers beyond established media organizations and professionals accelerates information flow, reduces mass media bias, and thus bypasses traditional newsroom gatekeeping process and breaks elite monopoly on framing or agenda setting. Connective action -self organized, personalized politics, diffused via interpersonal networks, and enabled by social media platforms -mobilizes citizens for civic and political participation (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011) . In China and other societies where mass media are often under tight state regulation, a growing number of users can express their private experience, emotion, and grievance in the networked public sphere, which may trigger intensive public expression and discussion when it resonates with larger sociopolitical issues such as air pollution (Chen & Reese, 2015) .
Research questions
Using Twitter data on a PM2.5 discussion network, our research aims to integrate networked public sphere theory with the risk society theory to articulate its networked and mediated nature. We map various institutional and individual actors and articulate their role and interrelationships. More specifically, we are interested in identifying actors who define risk and the role of media. We focus on four research questions: RQ1: Who are the institutional and individual actors and what are their characteristics in terms of geographic location, language, and political sentiment in the Twitter PM2.5 network as indicators of an emerging transnational public sphere? RQ2: What is the network structure among actors? RQ3: Who defines PM2.5 as risk in terms of being mentioned or replied to? RQ4: What are media's roles in defining PM2.5 as risk?
Data and methods
Twitter data were collected through NodeXL from 5 June to 10 June 2012. The keyword 'PM2.5' was chosen as it allowed the collection of tweets in multiple languages. Our data set includes 1047 users and 2051 relationships. Among the relationships, 1286 were selfloop tweet generated by 542 users, 23 'replies to' tweets generated by 10 users, and 742 mentions tweets generated by 539 users. The unit of analysis was an individual Twitter user or account. The data contained the user's Twitter profile information, including geographic location, self-description, and the URL leading us to the user's Twitter homepage.
Coding focused on each user's attributes based on the user's Twitter profile. Two coders fluent in Chinese and English and familiar with content analysis conducted the coding.
The Krippendorff alpha and the percentage agreement were calculated to estimate inter-coder reliability based on 50 users/accounts (5.3%) randomly selected from all users/accounts in the PM2.5 network. Language and political sentiment received high Krippendorff alpha, 0.92 and 0.87, respectively. The Krippendorff alpha was 0.72 for actor types, within the satisfactory range (Krippendorff, 2004) . The high percentage of inter-coder agreements further confirmed an acceptable reliability: 98% for language, 82% for political sentiment, and 86% for actor types.
Coding and results

RQ1: institutional and individual actors and attributes
Drawing on Beck's categorization of actors in the risk society and our content analysis of user profiles, we started with 18 categories: Chinese government, US government, businessperson, firm, IT expert, specialized expert, general expert, college or graduate student, international professional media, international citizen media, Chinese professional media, Chinese citizen media, media worker, Chinese NGO, transnational NGO, activist, layperson, and bot. Actor's identity was coded based on the self-reported Twitter bio. If a user's identity was not revealed in the Twitter bio, the two coders followed the attached link, tracing back to the user's affiliated organizations or personal blogs in order to find identity information. Table 1 showed that about 58% accounts in this PM2.5 Twitter network were laypersons, followed by IT experts (6.3%), media workers (5.6%), Chinese citizen media (5.6%), and college or graduate students (4%).
Geographic location was coded based on the Twitter question: 'Where in the world are you?' For users who did not share such information, the latitude and longitude of their location provided by Twitter were used. We categorized eight regions (Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Other regions of Asia, U.S.A. and Canada, Europe, Latin America, and Africa) and then recoded them into two regions for regression analysis: inside or outside of mainland China. Language was coded based on the main language a Twitter account used in his or her last 30 tweets. Nine categories (Chinese, English, Spanish, Japanese, Korean, German, Portuguese, Italian, and unidentified languages) were identified and then recoded into three categories for regression analysis: Chinese, English, and other languages. Table 1 presents the geographic and linguistic distribution of the PM2.5 Twitter network, suggesting a transnational public sphere across boundaries of nation-state. Close to two-thirds of the Twitter accounts (61.9%) were located in mainland China, while about one-fifth (18.2%) in the U.S.A. or Canada, 7.2% from other regions of Asia, 5.5% from Europe, 3.5% from Latin America, and the rest from Hong Kong (2.9%), Taiwan (0.6%), and Africa (0.2%). In terms of language, more than seven out of ten of the Twitter accounts (71.8%) used Chinese, 18.6% English, 3.9% Spanish, and 3.8% Japanese, respectively. The rest used Korean, German, Portuguese, Italian, or other languages. Table 3 shows a cross-tabulation of language by geographic location. Interestingly, even in the U.S.A. and Canada, there were more Twitter accounts tweeted in Chinese (53.9%) than in English (36.7%). The pattern held in Europe and other Asian countries, indicating many participants in this PM2.5 Twitter network were Chinese speakers and thus likely members of the global Chinese diaspora. By contrast, not all users in mainland China or Hong Kong tweeted in Chinese: 13.7% of the PM2.5 Twitter network participants in mainland China and 12.5% in Hong Kong used English. While Chinese was the dominant language and mainland China was the top location of participants, the networked public sphere formed via this PM2.5 Twitter network was clearly multilingual and transnational across borders of national states. Political sentiment was coded based on the user's last 30 tweets, using a 4-point scale (−1 = pro-Chinese government sentiment, 0 = neutral toward Chinese government, 1 = moderate antigovernment, and 2 = strong anti-Chinese government sentiment). Strong antigovernment sentiment was coded when a user posted at least one original tweet to criticize the Chinese government usually in terms of issues such as violating human rights, and information censorship; to deride Chinese government officials; or to provide other negative comments on the Chinese government. We coded users who only retweeted but did not post original antigovernment tweets as moderately anti-Chinese government. We originally applied similar rules as above to moderate and strong pro-Chinese government sentiment. However, there were too few positive sentiments (only 1% of the total coded data, see Table 4 ), so we merged the moderate and strong pro-Chinese government sentiment into one category. The mean for political sentiment was 0.32, indicating a neutral sentiment toward the Chinese government (Table 2) . A cross-tabulation of political sentiment and geographic location (Table 4) showed that the percentages of participants with antigovernment sentiment were actually higher in China than in other countries. This result was consistent with observations that the Chinese who overcame the Great Firewall to use Twitter tended to be more engaged in the type of political expression prohibited in mainland China.
RQ2: the structure of networked public sphere Figure 1 visualized the structure of the PM2.5 Twitter network, with node color representing actor type and node size representing the levels of in-degree centrality, that is, the number of 'mentions' and 'replies to' received. In the literature, being mentioned and replied to has been widely considered as a rough indicator of influence. Accordingly, the more frequently a participant was engaged by others via mention or reply to, the more central and the important risk definition producer he or she was (Xu, Sang, Blasiola, & Park, 2014) .
Among participants with the highest in-degree centrality (as measured by the number of mentions and replies to received), @BeijingAir was the Twitter account of the US embassy in Beijing, while @CGShanghaiAir and @guangzhou_air were Twitter accounts of US general consulates in Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively. Other actors with high in-degree centrality, a status indicator as a producer of risk definition, include @ablawyer, 2 a lawyer whose profile was linked to International Bar Association website; @marcelomena, Chile's Vice Minister of Environment and UNEP's Co-Chair of Coalition for Clean Air and Climate, a PhD in Environmental Engineering; IT expert @danielwide, 3 a well-known tech blogger since 2005; and @degewa, a Tibetan activist named Tsering Woeser (known in Chinese as Wei Se) whose book was banned in China for containing 'serious political mistakes' (Veg, 2007) . Two media accounts were among the top 20 participants with the highest in-degree centrality. The most prominent was @mranti. Its owner Micheal Anti was a Chinese journalist and an independent blogger, advocating for Internet freedom. The second was @nanfangzhoumo, the account of Southern Weekly, a respected liberal-leaning newspaper based in Guangzhou, China.
4 By contrast, laypersons, although large in number, were mostly peripheral. Figure 2 visualizes the same PM2.5 Twitter network by geographic locations, which confirmed a transnational public sphere with blurring geographic boundaries. Participants from different world regions interacted with one another in the PM2.5 Twitter network via replying to or mentioning. Yet, participants in Latin America and other Asia countries mainly interacted with those in the same geographic areas, respectively. Figure 3 presents the network visualization by language, revealing the linguistic boundary. Participants of the PM2.5 Twitter network mainly interacted with those speaking the same language. The language homophily was especially true for Spanish and Japanese speakers. English seemed to be a more boundary-expanding language as English-speaking participants interacted with speakers of other languages. Overall, the network graphs demonstrated persistent linguistic and cultural barriers, although geographic distance was relatively easy to overcome in the age of net and jet (Chen & Wellman, 2009) . Figure 4 visualizes the PM2.5 Twitter network by political sentiment. It showed that actors with strong anti-Chinese government sentiment occupied more central positions and those with moderate anti-Chinese government sentiment had a tendency to play the role as bridge that links otherwise disconnected pockets of the network (Menchen-Trevino & Mao, 2015) .
RQ3: regression analysis of who defined risk
Dependent variable in the regression analysis
The in-degree centrality of an actor in the PM2.5 Twitter network, measured as the frequency of being mentioned or replied to, was used as an indicator of actors who defined risk (Xu et al., 2014) . Network position often captured the information and communication flow better than hierarchical position or reputation (Weimann, Tustin, van Vuuren, & Joubert, 2007) . In-degree centrality has been widely used as an indicator of the impact, influence, or popularity of a specific node (Freeman, 1979; Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010) . Actors with greater in-degree centrality in terms of being mentioned or replied to received greater attention and thus were likely to have greater power in defining risk and controlling the information. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 .
Independent variable and control variables
The 18 actor types were consolidated into three categories due to the relatively small size of some actor types: (1) professional and political elite including categories such as government, firm, expert, student, NGO, or activist; (2) media such as international professional media, international citizen media, Chinese professional media, Chinese citizen media, and media worker; and (3) layperson. The number of followers and the number of following were used to measure a participant's overall Twitter network size. A greater number of followers on Twitter mean a larger size of potential audience (Himelboim et al., 2013) . Betweenness centrality measured how frequently an actor acted as a bridge on the shortest path through which any two other actors in the network were connected (Borgatti, 2005) . Information or resource flow slows down if an actor with high betweenness centrality was removed from the network. In this analysis, betweenness centrality was measured by the Table 5 . MR-QAP regression predicting in-degree centrality for being replied to/mentioned. relationships of being followed by and following other Twitter accounts. Twitter activity was measured by the number of tweets posted by a user.
Regression results MR-QAP regressions in UCINET were used to examine whether a range of factors contributed to higher levels of in-degree centrality. In Table 5 , Model 1 focused on user attributes such as actor types, geographic location, language, and political sentiment. Results showed that professional and political elite (β = .261, p < .001) and media (β = .206, p < .001) had significantly greater in-degree centrality than laypersons. Models 2 and 3 took user Twitter network properties and activities into account. As the number of followers was highly correlated with the number of tweets (r = 0.766), betweenness centrality (r = 0.578), and the number of following (r = 0.540), we included the number of followers in Model 2 and other network attributes in Model 3 to avoid multicollinearity. In Model 2, actors with more followers had significantly greater in-degree centrality (β = .287, p < .001). Language became significant as Chinese-speaking participants had higher indegree centrality than those who used a language that was neither Chinese nor English (β = .110, p < .05). In Model 3, betweenness centrality (β = .342, p < .001) and the number of tweets (β =. 166, p < .001) were significantly related to in-degree centrality. That is, participants who served as a bridge or who had posted more tweets had significantly greater in-degree centrality. Political and professional elites and media actors remained significant when Twitter network properties were added.
RQ4: the role of media
The results further shed light on the role of media in this PM2.5 Twitter network. While only two media accounts were among the top 20 in-degree centrality accounts (@mranti and @nanfangzhoumo, see pages 14-15), there were 12 media workers or outlets among the top 50 highest in-degree centrality. That is, media occupies an important place in this networked and transnational public sphere. The results of the MR-QAP regressions further illustrate that besides political and professional elites, media actors had greater in-degree centrality than laypersons. In particular, when Twitter network properties and activities were controlled, media actors had greater in-degree centrality than political and professional elites in the PM2.5 Twitter network (Models 2 and 3).
Discussion and conclusion
Risk society theory can be used as a theoretical touchstone to shed light on the conditions and limitations of modernity. How a society defines, measures, interprets, and manages risk reveals its power structure. Individuals and organizations who can define risk shape the power relations in the risk society (Beck, 1992) . In other words, risk definition and interpretation are saturated with power. Yet, Beck offered limited empirical analysis on the networked and mediated nature of the risk society. The risk society theory has not specified the roles played by different types of institutional and individual actors and their interrelationships in the production and distribution of risk definition. As importantly, developed in the mass media age, the risk society theory needs an update that takes into account digital media which have reconfigured the circulation of voices and images of contention. Drawing on digital trace data, publicly accessible government documents, and journalistic reports, this research integrates Beck's risk society and networked public sphere theories to explore the structure of the PM2.5 Twitter network, the risk definition producers in this network, and the role of media. First, diverse actors engaged in the PM2.5 Twitter network as about three out of ten participants were laypersons, a quarter of the participants were professional and political elites, and about one in six participants was media. The geographic distribution and linguistic diversity of this network hinted a transnational networked public sphere. Almost two out of five participants were outside mainland China and 30% tweeted in a language other than Chinese. Most participants who were located in the U.S.A. or Europe also tweeted in Chinese, suggesting their membership in the global Chinese diaspora. These findings resonate with previous research that Twitter allows networked information flow and engagement within diasporic publics (Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, & Pearce, 2011; Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012) . While Twitter enabled transnational participation, participants interacted more intensively with those (a) who located within rather than outside the same geographic region and (b) who used the same language rather than a different language. Japanese-and Spanish-speaking participants in this PM2.5 network almost exclusively communicated with those who spoke the same language, respectively. In addition, most users were politically neutral toward the Chinese government.
Second, political and professional elites, especially the US government, activists, and experts, were producers of the risk definition of PM2.5. The four US government Twitter accounts were at the center of the network, receiving high numbers of mentions and replies to. Although the case of PM2.5 was about air pollution and its health risk in China, the US embassy in Beijing set the public discourse in motion. That is, the US government was the primary player that defined the PM2.5 issue and its risk for the Chinese and international actors involved in the networked PM2.5 public sphere. In contrast, Chinese government accounts did not receive any mentions or replies to, conforming that at the time of the dispute, the Chinese government's tactics was mainly about blocking rather than engaging global social media platforms such as Twitter. While the centrality of political and professional elites clearly offers support to Beck's idea of risk definers, laypersons were not merely passive recipients as the risk society theory would suggest. The networked public sphere allowed them to share and endorse professional and political elite's risk definition via replying to/mentioning. If we looked further down the list of highest in-degree centrality, there were 12 laypersons among the top 50, indicating that ordinary users, via unintended collective efforts, could filter and amplify certain message on social media platforms (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012) .
Third, media organizations and professionals remained central in risk definition, as indicated by the presence of accounts of media workers and organizations among the top 50 accounts with the highest in-degree centrality. Media actors had greater in-degree centrality than political and professional elites as well as laypersons in the PM2.5 Twitter network when Twitter network properties and activities were controlled. Interestingly, the two media accounts with the highest in-degree centrality accounts were @mranti, an independent Chinese blogger, and @nanfangzhoumo, the account of Southern Weekly, a respected liberal-leaning Chinese national newspaper, indicating the influence of the emerging media activists and the established legacy news media. Fourth, participants' Twitter network properties and activities had significant impacts on their role of producing risk definition. Actors with more followers, greater betweenness centrality, or more posted tweets were central producers of risk definition. By contrast, users' geographic location had limited impact on being central producers of risk definition. Different from past studies that angry tweets spread faster and broader (Fan, Zhao, Chen, & Xu, 2013) , users' political sentiment did not affect their in-degree centrality.
This research shares the limitations of many other studies using Twitter data: people who did not tweet were not included in this analysis. The caveats aside, this research advances the risk society by focusing on the mediated process of risk definition in a networked public sphere, especially as the PM2.5 case started with the US embassy in Beijing tweeting its values and readings in 2008. The dispute between the Chinese and the US governments as well as the potential but not yet specified health risk attracted domestic and international media attention and fueled online discussion in and beyond the Chinese Internet sphere. While confirming the persistent power of political and professional elites and media as powerful producers of risk definition, this research demonstrates that diverse actors, including many laypersons, participated in the dissemination of risk definition. While still on the margin, laypersons actively interacted with elites and established media. The blurring geographic boundary revealed an emerging transnational public sphere, which, however, remained linguistically segregated.
Without US embassy's tweeting on PM2.5, the Chinese public would have no idea about PM2.5, its measurement, interpretation, as well as health consequences. The Chinese government did not measure or report PM2.5 in the air as of 2012. The public did not know its existence, let alone perceiving or understanding it as a risk. The Twitter network of PM2.5 alone, of course, cannot explain the subsequent development of risk perception and definition in the Chinese society. It is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the US embassy's independent monitoring of PM2.5 and tweeting made obvious the Chinese government's systematic non-or under-reporting of air pollution. The PM2.5 dispute in early June 2012 between the US and the Chinese governments as well as the debate it generated has been a significant milestone in terms of raising public awareness and mobilizing environmental professionals and activists. Soon after the dispute between the two governments in summer 2012, the Chinese government decided to measure and report PM2.5 nationwide in 2013. The Chinese government also adopted a range of policy changes and signed several international climate and environment treaties. While it is debatable whether and the extent to which new policies on air quality are reinforced, one change is real: PM2.5 reporting has become an integral part of national and local weather forecasts in China. The term itself has become a household name as an indicator of air pollution. In other words, regardless what specific motivations the US State Department had (providing a service to US diplomatic personnel and travelers, or simply shaming the Chinese government as part of the Pivot to Asia strategy pushed by former President Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton around that time), the US embassy in Beijing, using Twitter, played a pivotal role in defining the risk of air pollution and raising awareness of it in China. Notes 1. PM2.5 has health consequences: low birth weight, asthma, lung disease, and premature death, among others.
